The Wild Popularity of Trade Deals and Republicans as Potential New Doves

Two recent articles that we wanted to draw to your attention based on the new Chicago Council Survey results.  The first, by Phil Levy, Chicago Council senior fellow on the global economy, discusses the rough patches hitting negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), despite broad public support for trade agreements.  The article sheds light on why such popular trade agreements have yet to pass; read it on the Foreign Policy Shadow Government Blog.

The second article is co-written by yours truly, Dina Smeltz, Chicago Council senior fellow, public opinion and foreign policy, and Craig Kafura, Chicago Council senior program officer. While Republicans have been known for their hawkish stance on US military intervention abroad, the 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs indicates that there may be some shifts. Read more at Washington Post’s Monkey Cage.

Let us know what you think!

Americans Expecting a Power Shift in Energy Supply in Next Ten Years

By Dina Smeltz and Rachel Bronson

A global energy revolution is underway, driven in part by new technologies to unlock untapped resources and drive energy efficiency. A recent Chicago Council Survey shows that Americans place a high priority on a secure energy supply and support the development of renewable energy.  While renewables have many virtues, the public does not necessarily understand the urgency of developing alternative energy as a means to limit climate change. Nevertheless, Americans clearly lean toward cleaner methods of powering the country and expect renewable sources will overtake fossil fuels as the primary US energy sources in the next ten years.

Energy a top priority for Americans

Americans have long considered securing adequate supplies of energy a top goal for US foreign policy.  Going back decades to the first Chicago Council Survey in 1974, majorities have rated securing energy supplies a very important goal (66% in 2014 and 75% in 1974).  In the 2014 survey, it ranks second only to protecting the jobs of American workers. In addition, since 2010, three in four say that reducing US dependence on foreign oil is a very important goal (74% today).

The public has been slower to recognize the attendant issue of climate change, although more now than in the past four years view limiting climate change is a very important goal (41% compared to 33% in 2012, 35% in 2010, 42% in 2008).  If the views of American academic, government and business leaders make an impact on public opinion, concern about climate change among the public could rise. New results from a 2014 Chicago Council Leaders Survey show that leaders, like the public, also emphasize securing energy supplies as a top priority. [1] But leaders also consider climate change a top threat and say that limiting climate change should be one of the highest goals for US foreign policy.

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Emphasis on developing renewables, especially if business or government picks up the bill Continue reading

Half of Americans Say US Government Not Doing Enough on Climate Change

By Dina Smeltz, Craig Kafura, and Liz Deadrick

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As world leaders convene at the UN climate summit this week, new Chicago Council Survey results show that Americans rate climate change as a lower priority than other foreign policy concerns. At the same time, however, many Americans – and a majority among self-described Democrats – believe that the US government should do more to address this issue. An overall majority say they favor United States’ participation in an international treaty that would call for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Climate Change not a top threat for Americans

About a third of Americans (35%) say that climate change is a critical threat to the vital interests of the United States. Slightly more rate climate change as an important but not critical threat (38%). These ratings place the threat of climate change 16th out of the 20 total potential threats asked about in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey.

In line with these views, four in ten Americans (41%) say limiting climate change is a very important goal for the United States; a similar proportion (40%) says it is a somewhat important goal. The percentage rating the goal of limiting climate change as very important has grown recently: only three in ten viewed it as a very important goal in 2010 and 2012.

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Climate Change Seen as Future, Not Immediate, Threat 

Americans may say climate change is not a critical threat because they tend to view the problem as a distant threat to the United States. A November 2013 study by the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication found that a plurality of Americans thought that climate change will start to harm people in the United States in ten or more years (10% in ten years, 14% in 25 years, 11% in 50 years, and 12% in 100 years). Another 18 percent said that it will never harm the people in the US.  Just one in three (34%) said that climate change is harming the American people “right now.”   

But Many Want Government to Do More

While they see other priorities as more pressing, many want the US government to do more to address climate change. Half of Americans (50%) say that the US government is not doing enough to deal with the problem of climate change—up five percentage points from 2012, when a plurality (45%) said the government was not doing enough. Three in ten (31%) say the government is doing about the right amount, while two in ten (19%) say it is doing too much.

Some of the actions Americans would endorse include increasing tax incentives to encourage the development and use of alternative energy sources, such as solar or wind power (73%) and requiring automakers to increase fuel efficiency even if this increases the price of cars (69%). A large majority of Americans (71%) also support the US participating in a “new international treaty to address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.” Support is even higher among those who say that the government is not doing enough to deal with climate change—92 percent of this group believes that the US should participate. Conversely, 80 percent of people who say the government is doing too much oppose US participation in the treaty.

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Partisan Divides on Climate

Climate change is a highly partisan issue. Self-described Democrats are far more likely to see climate change as a critical threat to US vital interests (51%) than Independents (35%) and Republicans (12%). This is consistent with past Council Surveys: Democrats have always been at least 30 percentage points more likely to see climate change as a critical threat.

Similarly, more than half of Democrats (54%) say that limiting climate change is a very important goal versus 40 percent of Independents and 22 percent of Republicans. Democrats (66%) and Independents (51%) are much more inclined than Republicans (35%) to say the government is not doing enough to combat the problem.

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However, these partisan divisions over the importance of climate change do not mean that there are no areas of overlap: majorities of Republicans (54%), Democrats (86%), and Independents (70%) support the US participating in a new international treaty to address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Americans who consider themselves “a part of, or a supporter of, the Tea Party movement”[1] are also less likely to see climate issues as important. They are also less likely to support action to address climate change. Only two in ten of Tea Party sympathizers (19%) say climate change is a critical threat and only a quarter (27%) say liming climate change is a very important goal for the US. Half of Tea Party backers say the government is doing too much to deal with the problem of climate change (49%), and a majority oppose participating in a treaty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (56%).

“Climate Change” v. “Global Warming”

Some prior experimental survey research has demonstrated that using either “climate change” or “global warming” does not affect public perceptions of the problem’s seriousness[2]. Wording choices were also tested in the 2008 Chicago Council Survey, and this experiment did reveal a difference. Then, 44 percent of Americans labeled “global warming” a critical threat, while 39 percent said the same about “climate change.”

The 2014 Chicago Council Survey reiterated this experiment, randomly assigning “global warming” or “climate change” to half the survey sample. Results were similar to 2008. Americans are somewhat more concerned about “global warming” than they are about “climate change,” with 42 percent labeling global warming a critical threat, compared to 35 percent who say the same about climate change. There was not much of an effect on the rating of the issue as a goal. The public similarly rates limiting global warming (42%) and limiting climate change (41%) as very important goals.

Figure4

Republicans are particularly sensitive to the change in wording. Twenty-five percent of Republicans say global warming  is a critical threat—more than double the percentage for climate change (12%). Democrats and Independents do not appear to differentiate between the two: they are just as likely to view global warming and climate change as critical threats.

About the 2014 Chicago Council Survey

The analysis in this report is based on data from the 2014 Chicago Council Survey and previous Chicago Council Surveys of the American public on foreign policy. The 2014 Survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research using their large-scale, nationwide research panel between May 6 to May 29, 2014 among a national sample of 2,108 adults, 18 years of age or older, living in all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. The margin of error for the overall sample is ± 2.1 percentage points; for the experiment on climate change and global warming, the margin of error is ± 4.2 percentage points.

For more results from the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, please see Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment, which can be found at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org.

The 2014 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, the Korea Foundation, the United States-Japan Foundation, and the personal support of Lester Crown.

For more information regarding the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, please contact Dina Smeltz, senior fellow, Public Opinion and Global Affairs (dsmeltz@thechicagocouncil.org; 312-821-6860) or Craig Kafura, senior program officer, Studies (ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org; 312-821-7560).

 

[1] Among those who consider themselves a part of or identify with the Tea Party movement (12% overall), 49 percent identify as Republicans, 18 percent as Democrats, and 31 percent as Independents.

[2] Villar, A., & Krosnick, J. A. (2011). “Global warming vs. climate change, taxes vs. prices: Does word choice matter?” Climatic Change, 105, 1-12.

Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment

Yesterday, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs released Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment, the first of several reports on the 2014 Chicago Council Survey. Below are a selection of key findings from the report, which you can find in full at www.thechicagocouncil.org. Be sure to follow @ChicagoCouncil@IvoHDaalder, @RoguePollster, and @ckafura for continuing discussion of the 2014 Survey results. 

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Among much of the political elite today, a specter is haunting America—the specter of isolationism. Since the last Chicago Council Survey in 2012, many policymakers, politicians, and pundits have come to question the continued willingness of Americans to engage in world affairs. As global troubles brew in Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine, some claim that the public is turning inward and resistant to any sort of US military intervention. And they have used public opinion polling to argue their points.

Public continues to support an active role for the United States in world affairs.

But a new survey by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, conducted from May 6 to 29, 2014, demonstrates that isolationism is not the appropriate term to describe current public opinion. Public support for international engagement remains solid, with six in ten Americans in favor of an active role in world affairs. At the same time, four in ten Americans now say the US should stay out of world affairs—a proportion that has grown to its highest point since the first Chicago Council Survey in 1974.

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The new survey data show that this growing desire among Americans to “stay out” of world affairs is linked to increased criticism of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a decreased sense of threat, a long-standing desire to focus on domestic problems, and an increased divide among Republicans on this question. But the data do not show a desire to disengage from the world. Instead, results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey confirm continued, and in some cases even growing support for US international involvement, especially when it comes to nonmilitary forms of engagement.

Indeed, the most striking finding of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey is the essential stability of American attitudes toward international engagement, which have not changed all that much since the Council conducted its first public opinion survey 40 years ago. As they have for four decades, Americans support strong US international leadership, place primacy on protecting American jobs over other foreign policy goals, favor diplomacy with countries that are hostile toward the United States, support participation in many international treaties and agreements, and endorse trade despite economic setbacks. Americans remain selective about when they will support putting US troops in harm’s way, but are most likely to do so in response to top threats or humanitarian crises.

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American Public Opinion on NATO

By Ivo H. Daalder, president, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

NATO Leaders meet in Wales this week for what will be the most important Summit meeting since the end of the Cold War. Russian actions in Ukraine pose a fundamental challenge to European security—and thus a challenge to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What do Americans think about NATO, the threats to security, and the steps the US might take to uphold its defense commitments on the other side of the Atlantic? In the new 2014 Chicago Council Survey, the American public offers broad support for the U.S. commitment to NATO, views Russia increasingly unfavorably, and worries about Russia’s territorial ambitions. At the same time, support for sending troops to defend NATO countries continues to be relatively weak.

Here’s what Americans had to say about these issues from the 2014 Chicago Council Survey conducted May 6-29.

Americans support for NATO is at highest level in 40 years

Since the first Chicago Council Survey in 1974, majorities have consistently favored maintaining or increasing the U.S. commitment to NATO. Today, such support stands at 78 percent, the highest level in 40 years. As in previous polls, most of this support comes from Americans believing that the U.S. commitment to NATO should remain as it as it is now (66%); an additional 12 percent favor increasing the commitment. Only 7 percent want to withdraw entirely from NATO, and another 12 percent want to decrease U.S commitment.

NATO-commitment

Opinion of Russia hits post-Cold War low

The strong support of NATO may reflect increased wariness about Russia following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support for rebels in Ukraine. American views toward Russia have now dropped to the lowest level since the Cold War. On a scale of 0 to 100, Americans rate Russia a 36 on average in 2014. This is just above the ratings Americans gave to the Soviet Union during the Chicago Council’s Cold War-era surveys of 1978-1986 and is the lowest rating ever given to Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

americanfavorability_graph

At the same time, only a minority of Americans (38%) sees Russia’s territorial ambitions as a critical threat to the vital interests of the United States, though another 50 percent of Americans see it is an important threat. Perhaps as a result, only three in ten support using U.S. troops to come to Ukraine’s defense if Russia invades the rest of that country (30%), though that is an increase of ten points compared to when the question was asked in 1994.

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Only a minority would support using US troops to defend NATO’s Baltic members

When asked about the possibility of Russia invading the Baltic countries, only 44 percent of Americans support using U.S. forces to protect “NATO allies such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.” While low, especially given the commitment to collective defense of the NATO Treaty, current support for using US troops to defend NATO allies is much higher than in the late 1990s. Then, just three in ten Americans (28%) supported using US troops if Russia invaded Poland, which was about to join the Alliance as a new member. Moreover, while higher than in the case of the Baltic states today, in 1994 only a bare majority of Americans (54%) supported using US troops to defend “western Europe” from a Russian invasion.

American Public Opposes Arming Rebels in Syria

By Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura

With the conflict in Syria well into its fourth year, Chicago Council Survey results from May 2014 show that a majority of the American public does not see the conflict in Syria as a critical threat to the United States. While the Obama administration has proposed $500 million to train and arm rebel groups in Syria, Americans oppose sending arms and supplies to anti-government groups in Syria. Instead, a majority of the public favors increasing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Syria and half say they would support enforcing a no-fly zone.

One in four Americans see conflict in Syria as a critical threat

At the time of this survey, only a quarter (24%) of Americans saw the continuing conflict in Syria as a critical threat. A majority (61%) considered it an important but not critical threat. This is far lower than other threats asked about in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, placing 19th out of 20 threats to the U.S.

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While some politicians have called for a greater US role in Syria, only one in four Americans think the United States is not doing enough (26%). Half (50%) think that the US government is currently doing about the right amount on Syria, with two in ten (20%) saying it is doing too much.

Continued opposition to arming rebels

Americans remain opposed to providing material support to rebel groups in Syria. One in four (25%) say that they would support the United States and its allies sending arms and supplies to anti-government groups in Syria, while seven in ten (70%) oppose doing so. Americans said much the same in 2012, when 67 percent opposed arming rebel groups.

Support for arming rebel groups in Syria is highest among those Americans who say the US is not doing enough, but a majority of this group still opposes sending arms and supplies (40% support, 57% oppose). Larger majorities among those who say the US is doing the right amount (74%, 23% support) or too much (85%, 15% support) oppose sending weapons and supplies.

Solid majority endorse increased sanctions on Syria

After asking for assessments of the US government’s current approach to Syria, respondents were presented with several specific options that could be taken. Two in three Americans (67%) support increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria. This is a slight increase from 2012, when 63 percent of the public supported increasing sanctions on the Assad regime.

Americans divided on Syrian no-fly zone

Though Americans seem fairly satisfied with the current approach to Syria, there is a relatively high level of public support for enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria, including bombing Syrian air defenses. On this issue, the public is evenly divided, with 48 percent in support and 47 percent opposed. This level of support is consistent whether the operation is part of a United Nations Security Council authorized military mission or if done as part of a coalition of like-minded allies (48% support for each).

As might be expected, support for enforcing a no-fly zone is highest among those Americans who say the US is not doing enough on Syria (65%, 32% oppose). Meanwhile, Americans who say the government is doing about the right amount on Syria are divided on the issue (50% support, 46% opposed). ). Those who say the government is doing too much oppose a no-fly zone (71%, vs. 28% in support).

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Few want to send troops into Syria, but more support peacekeeping mission

Many Americans are also open to the idea of contributing US troops to a peacekeeping mission in Syria if a peace agreement is reached. A sizable minority (44%) say they would support sending troops to enforce that agreement, with 55 percent opposed. Other than for peacekeeping, though, the idea of sending US troops to Syria is unpopular with the American public: fewer than two in ten (17%) support the US sending troops to Syria. Even those Americans who say the US is not doing enough on Syria are hesitant to put boots on the ground: only a quarter of this group favor sending troops.

Support for sending troops appears to be linked to a sense of moral obligation, national interest and a belief that US intervention would make a difference. When those who supported sending troops to Syria were asked the reason for their support, they most frequently cited that the US had a moral obligation to act, it would make a difference in stopping the war, or that it was in our national interest to act. Fewer said they supported sending troops to Syria because the mission was likely to succeed, people around the world would view it as a legitimate action, the risk of American lives would be low, or the financial cost would be acceptable. Those opposed to sending troops to Syria cited the risks to American lives, doubts that the situation is vital to US national interest, potential financial costs, and skepticism that US intervention would make a difference.

Public opposes accepting Syrian refugees into United States

A majority of Americans (55%) oppose accepting Syrian refugees into the United States, while four in ten (42%) support doing so. This opposition appears to reflect American concerns about immigrants and refugees more broadly. Indeed, Americans who see large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the US as a critical threat are far less likely to support accepting Syrian refugees (19%) than those Americans who see it as an important but not critical threat (51%), or not an important threat at all (61%).

There are also differences among age groups when it comes to admitting Syrian refugees into the United States: a majority of Americans under the age of 45 support taking in refugees (52%; 45% opposed), while a majority of Americans older than 45 oppose doing so (64%; 32% support).

Democrats more likely to support peacekeeping; Republicans more opposed to refugees

As is generally the case with peacekeeping missions, Democrats are more likely to support sending troops (54%, vs. 38% of Republicans and Independents). Republicans, meanwhile, are more likely to support enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria (55%, vs. 49% of Democrats and 42% of Independents). Americans who say they identify as part of or sympathize with the Tea Party movement are more likely to support a no-fly zone as well (59%, vs. 47% of non-tea partiers). Note that among those who consider themselves a part of or identify with the Tea Party movement (12% overall), 49 percent identify as Republicans, 18 percent as Democrats, and 31 percent as Independents.

When it comes to refugees, there are strong partisan divisions as well. A majority of Democrats (55%) support taking in refugees from Syria, though only a quarter of Republicans (27%) and four in ten Independents (40%) agree. This fits with partisans’ differing levels of concern about immigrants and refugees coming to the United States, which a majority of Republicans (55%) see as a critical threat. In contrast, only two in ten Democrats (21%) say the same, while Independents split the difference (42%).

On other issues, as is usually the case in foreign policy, partisans agree. Majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents oppose sending troops into Syria, oppose arming anti-government groups, and support increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria.

About the 2014 Chicago Council Survey

This analysis is based on data from the 2014 Chicago Council Survey and previous Chicago Council Surveys of the American public on foreign policy. The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research using their large-scale, nationwide research panel between May 6 to May 29, 2014 among a national sample of 2,108 adults, 18 years of age or older, living in all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. The margin of error for the overall sample is ± 2.1 percentage points.

A full report on the results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey will be released on September 15.

The 2014 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, the Korea Foundation, and the United States-Japan Foundation.

 

Americans Prefer Neutrality in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura

Chicago Council Survey results from May, before the recent outbreak of fighting in Gaza, show that Americans did not see the lack of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians to be a critical threat to the vital interests of the United States. A solid majority continued to want the United States to remain neutral in the conflict, even though their sympathies tended to lie more with Israel than the Palestinian Authority.

Americans opt for neutrality

Over the last decade of Chicago Council Surveys, a majority of Americans have consistently advocated for a neutral approach to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Chicago Council results from May 2014 found that six in ten (64%) said the United States should not take either side, while three in ten (30%) favored taking Israel’s side (3% favored the Palestinians’ side).

Neutrality in Conflict

While these recent data were collected prior to the June kidnappings that sparked outbreak of fighting in July, previous data suggest that these incidents would most likely not have a dramatic effect on Americans’ preference for the United States to stay neutral. For example, results from the identical question in a 2000 Gallup Poll fielded just prior to the beginning of the Second Intifada found that a majority said the United States should not take either side. Two years later, the 2002 Chicago Council Survey found a majority continued to prefer that the United States remain neutral, just after an outbreak of fighting in Jenin and an extended standoff at the Church of the Nativity. And in 2010, a year after Operation Cast Lead in Gaza ended in Israeli forces declaring a unilateral ceasefire, a majority of Americans continued to support not taking either side in the conflict.

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Russia Reality Check

By Kjell Engelbrekt

US-Russia relations appear to be at an all-time low ever since the establishment of the Russian Federation in the fall of 1991. The new Chicago Council Survey figures clearly demonstrate this general trend, even without accounting for the presumable further damage done by the shooting down of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine on July 17th. That incident may very well have been a horrible mistake by pro-Kremlin separatists. Yet while consistent efforts by the Kremlin to conceal its role in supporting the separatists and furnishing them with heavy weapons, such as sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems, might succeed in keeping Russians misled, they will deepen distrust in the United States and the West at large.

There are various interpretations as to how US-Russia relations evolved from the initial attempt by the first Obama administration to improve ties through selective engagement on issues of common concern (the ‘reset’ approach) to the mutual frustration of the mid-2010s. In fact, the deterioration accelerated sharply over just 12 to 18 months. As long as Dmitry Medvedev occupied the presidential post (that is, until early 2012), some aspects of the bilateral relationship—such as cooperation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—were actually moving in the right direction.

But in 2013-2014 presidents Putin and Obama repeatedly misjudged each other at critical junctures. Putin appears to have believed he would have a free hand at bullying neighbors into accepting higher prices on Russian gas and coercing them to accept his own deeply asymmetric version of the European Union. Supposedly, he also thought his insistence on placing Ukraine at the center of his strategic vision would be tolerated by Western governments.

Few political leaders in the transatlantic community recognized the full potential for conflict inherent in Ukraine’s Maidan movement. Obama and his advisors were also slow to realize that Putin not only sought to rebuild Russia, but a Soviet Union–minus the ideology yet including its international political prominence. Putin’s diplomatic envoys have in fact been working overtime to create conditions that would blunt US influence not just in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ but in the Middle East, Europe, as well as in Latin America.

The realization that the Kremlin is not just ‘sticking it to the Americans’ (in extending asylum to Edward Snowden, for instance) but is actively trying to undermine US primacy in world affairs is gradually catching up with American public opinion. And Russia’s covert military operations in eastern Ukraine—after already having conquered Crimea through a well-executed stealth operation in mid-Spring—and the ongoing cover-up of the circumstances surrounding the downing of flight MH17 now provide a sobering reality check for many others in the international community, not least those preoccupied with international law and order. To the extent that leaders in Europe, Southeast Asia and elsewhere respond adequately to this situation, the US government will be in a better position to limit the Kremlin’s opportunities to further exploit Western and international benevolence and neglect.

Kjell E. Engelbrekt was a visiting fellow at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the University of Illinois at Chicago this past spring. He is currently working on a manuscript that examines the impact of a changing distribution of power on the diplomatic practices of great powers in international institutions, especially the UN Security Council and the G8/G20. His recent writings have focused on NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the US-Russia ‘reset’ policy, and evolving relations between Asia’s great powers and the United States and Europe. Engelbrekt holds a PhD in political science from Stockholm University. He is associate professor at the Swedish National Defense College and member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences. He has served as a research fellow at Columbia University (New York), Humboldt-Universität (Berlin), and the European University Institute (Florence). In addition to his academic record, Engelbrekt has served as secretary-general of the Swedish North Atlantic Treaty Association, research analyst at the RFE/RL Research Institute, and consulted for the UN Development Program and the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Ann Coulter, the World Cup and What the Polls Show

By Dina Smeltz

Conservative columnist Ann Coulter probably didn’t watch the US play Belgium on Tuesday afternoon. But that didn’t stop her from tweeting “Doing the job Americans just won’t do: Immigrants fill up roster of ‘U.S.’ soccer team.” This tweet extended her rant from last week in which she blamed Ted Kennedy’s 1965 immigration law for a possible increase in soccer viewership in the US [she also railed against the sport because it is collectivist, foreign, and boring]. In her words:  “I promise you: No American whose great-grandfather was born here is watching soccer. One can only hope that, in addition to learning English, these new Americans will drop their soccer fetish with time.”

While I don’t agree with Coulter’s position on soccer (or anything else, for that matter), there is indeed greater interest in soccer among Hispanic Americans than the rest of the public. A Pew survey conducted June 26-29 found that a majority of  Hispanic Americans (55%) are following the World Cup very or somewhat closely, compared to about a third of Blacks (32%) or Whites (32%). The Wall Street Journal/NBC News/Annenberg poll results from June 27-30 found a similar pattern (47% of Hispanics are watching the World Cup very or somewhat closely, compared to 33% among Black Americans and 26% among White Americans). And an Ipsos poll from April 7-11 found that one-third of Hispanic Americans said they would be following the tournament or some teams closely, double the percentage for respondents overall. Continue reading

Is the public really learning to love globalization?

Guest post by Daniel Maliniak and Ryan Powers, first posted on The Monkey Cage.

Responses from our May 2014 TRIP Snap Poll of international relations (IR) scholars present an interesting contrast to public opinion on NAFTA’s effect on the U.S and Mexican economies over the past 20 years. Scholars overwhelmingly agree that NAFTA has been good for both the U.S. (79 percent) and Mexican (71 percent) economies. The public’s assessment – from a 2013 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs – of NAFTA’s effect on the Mexican economy is similarly optimistic (70 percent good) but is split on its effect on the U.S. economy (49 percent good, 46 percent bad).

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One reason that scholars may be so bullish on the economic benefits of NAFTA and free trade more generally is that they tend to be familiar with economic teachings, which show that  free(r) trade and international trade agreements tend to be welfare enhancing. The educated public may be similar. Indeed, Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox, two prominent scholars of trade and public opinion, argue that those who have attended college are “likely to be far more informed than others about the aggregate efficiency gains associated with expanded trade, especially if they have had any contact at all with economics courses and with the theory of comparative advantage.” Thus, they claim, college education is not correlated with pro-trade sentiment among the public for material reasons but because, at least in the United States, students are generally taught that trade has beneficial impacts.

If Hainmueller and Hiscox are right, we would expect college-educated individuals to look more like IR scholars than those who did not attend college. To make this comparison as clear as possible, we focus our attention on respondents in the public and scholarly samples who view NAFTA as zero sum (bad for U.S. and good for Mexico) and those that view NAFTA as mutually beneficial (good for both U.S. and Mexico). We see these two groups as representing protectionist and free-trade factions of the public. In this sense, we are comparing those who see NAFTA as something of a beggar-thy-neighbor policy, benefiting the Mexican economy at the expense of Americans, to those who see NAFTA as a means to grow the economic pie.

The graph below shows the proportions of individuals at each level of education who said NAFTA has been good for Mexico but bad for the United States in the top panel and those who said NAFTA has been good for both United States and Mexico in the bottom panel. The black lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

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Scholarly Opinion

IR scholars — as highly educated and economically literate individuals — look a lot like the kind of people Hainmueller and Hiscox describe. Just 3 percent of scholars view NAFTA as a zero-sum game that benefits the Mexican economy but not the US economy. Additionally, a large majority of IR scholars view NAFTA as being good for both the U.S. and Mexican economies. In the overwhelming view of IR scholars, the rising tide of NAFTA has lifted all boats.

 Notably, we find relatively little variation across scholars in different subfields and/or paradigms. While IPE scholars (71 percent) do fall slightly above their colleagues (65 percent) in terms of viewing NAFTA as being beneficial to both nations, the gap is not statistically meaningful. With a crude proxy for income, an individual’s rank in their department, we find no systematic difference across full professors, associate professors, assistant professors or visiting/adjunct professors and other non-tenure track instructors. What variation we do find comes from respondents’ theoretical priors. Those who characterize their research as paradigmatically liberal or realist are more likely (75 percent and 74 percent, respectively) than those with other paradigmatic commitments (64 percent) to see NAFTA as a win-win.

Public Opinion

The most educated members of the public (those with a PhD, MD or JD) see NAFTA as increasing the size of the pie. Among the broader public, however, the findings are less clear. Again, consistent with Hainmueller and Hiscox’s expectations, the proportions in the good-good portion of the population are trending upward with education level. That said, those who have attended college are more, rather than less, likely than those with at most a high school education to view NAFTA as bad for United States but good for Mexico. (This effect does not disappear once we account for the fact that college attendants are somewhat less likely to answer “don’t know”).

Beyond the more intuitive crosstab above, we find that, in a multinomial logit regression model predicting the four potential combinations of economic assessments, education is not a systematically meaningful determinant after controlling for income, age, gender and party ID. Just the act of attending college does not seem to make individuals in the public less likely to view NAFTA as a zero-sum game [See results]. Only the possession of a PhD or professional degree has a consistent and statistically significant, negative effect on an individual’s likelihood to see NAFTA as bad for either country’s economy. It may be that holding a PhD or professional degree is simply an indicator of working in a non-tradeable, relatively high-paying sector of the economy. This group of highly educated individuals stands to gain economically from more open trade, and their demographics map very closely with our sample of scholars.

The results above suggest that many college-educated Americans are not internalizing the implications of free-trade models that they were presumably exposed to in their course work or that other considerations are more salient when it comes to NAFTA in particular. With close to 20 years of news coverage touting both extremes of the NAFTA story, perhaps it is not surprising that substantial portions of the educated American public are skeptical of NAFTA and its implications for the U.S. economy.

Daniel Maliniak is a PhD candidate at University of California at San Diego. Ryan Powers is a PhD candidate at University of Wisconsin at Madison. Maliniak and Powers are co-PIs on the Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) project.